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Abstract
Increasingly concepts of sustainable development are finding their way into local and 
regional development strategies. This is also true in the USA, though not through the 
Local Agenda 21 process, as is the case in much of the rest of the world. The approach to 
‘sustainable development’ in the USA is a set of policy approaches collectively referred to 
as ‘smart growth’. Smart growth is sometimes referred to as a uniquely ‘American’ variant 
of sustainable development. In contrast to Local Agenda 21, smart growth has captured the 
imagination of American policy makers, at all spatial scales. Smart growth is most attractive 
as a local and regional development strategy. In this paper I explore compare Local Agenda 
21 and Smart Growth in the context of the USA and Europe using secondary data sources 
and analysis as well as a case study from Massachusetts, USA. 
Key words: Sustainable development, local and regional scales, USA, Europe.
Resum. El creixement intelligent i els seus crítics: Una avaluació de les estratègies europees i 
nord-americanes de desenvolupament sostenible local i regional
El concepte del desenvolupament sostenible s’obre camí cada vegada més en les estratègies 
de desenvolupament local i regional. Aquesta tendència també succeix als EUA, encara que 
en aquest país no pren el nom d’Agenda 21 Local, com és el cas en gran part de la resta 
del món. L’enfocament de «desenvolupament sostenible» als EUA es pot considerar com 
un conjunt de polítiques que, col·lectivament, es coneixen amb el nom de «creixement 
intel·ligent» (smart growth). El creixement intel·ligent es considera a vegades com una 
variant exclusivament «americana» de desenvolupament sostenible. Al contrary del que ha 
passat amb l’Agenda 21, aquest concepte de creixement intel·ligent ha aconseguit captar 
l’interès dels respnsables polítics locals als EUA: En aquest article es compara l’Agenda 21 
Local i creixement intel ligent en el context dels EUA i Europa, utilitzant fonts secundàries 
de dades i anàlisi, així com un estudi de cas de Massachusetts, EUA.
Paraules clau: desenvolupament sostenible, escales local i regional, Estats Units d’Amèrica, 
Europa.
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Resumen. El crecimiento inteligente y sus críticos: Una evaluación de las estrategias europeas 
y norte-americanas de desarrollo sostenible local y regional
El concepto del desarrollo sostenible se abre camino cada vez más en las estrategias de 
desarrollo local y regional. Esta tendencia también ocurre en EE.UU., aunque en este país 
no toma el nombre de Agenda 21 Local, como es el caso en gran parte del resto del mundo. 
EDl enfoque del desarrollo sostenible local en los EE.UU. puede considerarse como un 
conjunto de políticas que, colectivamente, se conocen con el nombre de «crecimiento 
inteligente» (smart growth). Así, el crecimiento inteligente se considera a veces como una 
variante exclusivamente americana de desarrollo sostenible. Al contrario de lo ocurrido 
con la Agenda 21, este concepto de crecimiento inteligente ha logrado captar el interés de 
los responsables políticos locales en los EE.UU.: En este artículo se compara la Agenda 21 
Local y crecimiento inteligente en el contexto de los EE.UU. y Europa, utilizando fuentes 
secundarias de datos y análisis, así como un estudio de caso de Massachusetts, Estados 
Unidos.
Palabras clave: desarrollo sostenible, escalas local i regional, Estados Unidos de América, 
Europa.
Résumé. La croissance intelligente et ses critiques: une évaluation des stratégies européennes et 
nord-américaines du développement durable local et régional
Le concept de développement durable est utilisé de plus en plus dans les stratégies de 
développement local et régional. Cette tendance se trouve aussi aux États-Unis, bien que 
dans ce pays le nom de l’Agenda 21 local, commun dans une grande partie du monde, 
est remplacé par l’expression « Croissance intelligente ». Ainsi, la croissance intelligente 
est parfois considéré comme une variante exclusivement américaine du développement 
durable. Contrairement à ce qui s’est passé avec le programme Action 21 local, le concept 
de croissance intelligente a réussi à capter l’intérêt des politiciens locaux des États-Unis: 
Cet article compare le programme Action 21 local et le concept de croissance intelligente 
contexte des États-Unis et en Europe, en utilisant des sources secondaires de données et 
d’analyse ainsi que d’une étude de cas du Massachusetts, États-Unis.
Mots clé: développement durable, échelles local et régional, États-Unis d’Amérique, 
Europe.
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Introduction
This paper explores the broad geo-political differences between European 
approaches to local and regional sustainable development and those found 
in the United States. With a particular focus on Local Agenda 21 in Europe 
and Smart Growth, the US approximation of Local Agenda 21. This paper 
seeks to flesh out key differences in the role of actors, the state and the market 
and regional and local coordination. As the world seems to be undergoing an 
increasing shift to market-oriented regulatory approaches, this paper should 
serve as a cautionary statement for transforming state functions into market 
ones.
The paper begins with by juxtaposing urban/regional sustainable develop-
ment approaches embodied in Local Agenda 21 (hereinafter LA 21) and Smart 
Growth. The purpose here is to draw out the inherent differences between 
the LA 21 approach and smart growth. Furthermore, it seeks to show that 
the evolution of LA 21 in the US and sustainable development in general has 
evolved in such a way that smart growth has become the vehicle through which 
sustainable development might occur in the United States of America. In the 
next section the paper describes smart growth, its history, goals and approach. 
The argument here is that in contrast to LA 21, the smart growth agenda 
appeals to a general economic development strategy pervasive in the US. This 
section also sets up smart growth’s scalar linkages, between the urban and the 
regional. The penultimate section presents a case study from Massachusetts to 
help flesh out these ideas more fully. The final section presents some conclu-
sions about the data and conceptual material presented. 
Before commencing it is necessary to present a brief word on methodology. 
In trying to delineate the differences in LA 21 and smart growth the paper 
draws from of a broad variety of literature and analysis. The analysis is original, 
though some data comes from secondary sources. The cases studies were com-
piled through archival researches and interviews between 2006-2008. Personal 
interviews were conducted with policy makers at the state and local level as 
well as those in various growth coalitions. These interviews greatly enriched 
this analysis. The promise of anonymity requires that agency or organization 
be used rather than individual names. 
LA 21 and Sustainable Development —and the USA
Jacobs (1999) referred to sustainable development as a highly ‘contested con-
cept’. Its definitions are many, and can mean things to different groups in 
different places and scales. We are not interested in this debate. What is inter-
esting is how sustainable development approaches get ‘rolled-out’ in different 
geo-political contexts. That is to say we are interested in the key processes, 
institutions and organizations taking responsibility for ‘delivering’ sustain-
able development, especially its local and regional forms. The LA 21 process, 
for example, relies upon certain norms for pursuing sustainable development 
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that are formalized by the state and key actors and organizations. This broad 
examination of sustainable development will help focus our analysis below. 
Toward this end, this section begins with a discussion of LA 21 in general. 
Then, drawing on examples from Europe the paper highlights some of the 
larger contextual issues through which sustainable development has emerged. 
This is necessarily a cursory overview of local sustainable development in the 
European context. The objective here is to draw out three key themes: 1) the 
process of LA 21, 2) the scalar coordination of sustainable development, and 3) 
the norms established by the state for delivering sustainable development in 
Europe. The paper uses these categories to frame an argument about LA 21 in 
the US, especially regarding its failure to catch on. These concepts will then 
form the basis of the next section on the smart growth phenomenon.
Local Agenda 21 and Sustainable Development
The Rio Conference distinguished itself from previous global ‘environmental’ 
conferences in that it proposed a solution to the problem of unsustainable devel-
opment (in contrast to previous efforts cf. Chandler and Morse 1964; Solow 
1974). Delegates to the Rio Conference recognized that the earth has a limited 
capacity to provide a continuous flow of resources and absorb the externali-
ties of development1. The solution proposed is articulated in Agenda 21, and 
specifically LA 21. Chapter 28 codified LA 21 in that it recognized that local 
governments play a key role in bringing about sustainable development across 
scales. LA 21 principles emphasized that local authorities need to make consid-
erable changes to their policy making approaches so they can incorporate the 
perspectives and views of a range of interests. Chapter 28 of Agenda 21 states:
Each local authority should enter into a dialogue with its citizens, local orga-
nizations and private enterprises and adopt a ‘LA 21’. Through consultation 
and consensus building, local authorities would learn from citizens and from 
local, civic, community, business and industrial organizations and acquire 
the information needed for formulating the best strategies. The process of 
consultation would increase household awareness of sustainable development 
issues. Local authority programmes, policies, laws and regulations to achieve 
LA 21 objectives would be assessed and modified, based on local programmes 
adopted. (UNCED, 1992)
Key to LA 21 is a broad based, multi-stakeholder planning process focused 
on balancing economy, social equity and the environment. It was believed the 
success of LA 21 would also turn on the ability of a local authority to redirect 
its policies, laws and regulations to align with the principles that emerged from 
the planning efforts. By 1996, according to LA 21, cities were supposed to have 
engaged the public in a consultation process and achieved consensus around a 
1. Indeed the original Earth Summit held in Stockholm in 1972 and Habitat I in Vancouver, 
Canada both addressed these issues.
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local sustainability program. The process is quite simple (see Figure 1). And, 
as Beatley (2000) notes, by 1996, 1,119 communities in Europe had initiated 
LA 21 programs. A survey published in 2002 by ICLEI showed that some 
6400 communities from 113 countries worldwide had become involved in 
LA 21 activities over the previous decade (ICLEI 2002). The popularity of LA 
21 as a local and regional development strategy was again affirmed when 400 
European Communities, representing 100 million Europeans from 36 coun-
tries, signed the Aalborg Charter in 1994. The Aalborg Charter, which was 
facilitated by ICLEI as part of their European Sustainable Cities and Towns 
Campaign, committed its signatories to develop local sustainability action 
plans in parallel with LA 21. 
The process of LA 21 is critical for distinguishing it from smart growth. As 
will discussed in more detail below the commitment, even interest, in LA 21 
around the US was minimal, only 22 cities in America have (or have had) LA 
21 processes. Thus part of the argument for smart growth being an American 
variant of sustainable development rests on the rejection of the LA 21 process. 
As evidence that a process existed beyond the proscriptions found in Chapter 
28, we now examine the influence of the international organization ICLEI 
on LA 212. 
Since 1992, ICLEI, has positioned itself as the standard bearer for imple-
menting LA 21. Indeed, ICLEI hatched the LA 21 idea a year before the 
2. ICLEI (formerly the International Council of Local Environmental Initiatives, now 
ICLEI—Local Governments for Sustainability) has acted in a consulting capacity to aid 
local authorities world-wide with their LA 21 activities.
Figure 1. Local Agenda 21 Process. Source: ICELI 2006.
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1992 Rio Summit (Wheeler, 2004). The goal of ICLEI’s LA 21 Campaign 
is to ‘to build a worldwide movement of local governments and associations 
dedicated to achieving sustainable development through participatory, mul-
ti-stakeholder sustainable development planning and the implementation 
of resulting LA21 action plans’ (ICLEI, 2006). In 1994, ICLEI organized 
the European Sustainable Cities and Towns Campaign, which lead to the 
Aalborg Charter. Two years later steps for implementing the Aalborg Charter 
were drafted and ratified under the Lisbon Action Plan (Beatley, 2000). Since 
Lisbon, ICELI has worked with hundreds of communities on their LA 21 plans 
and ‘organized’ thousands of communities. According to ICLEI over 2000 
European communities have now signed onto the Aalborg Charter. In addition 
to their organizing efforts, ICLEI also provides technical assistance, research 
and evaluation and assistance in piloting new participatory approaches. The 
purpose here is not to trumpet the efforts of ICLEI, but to suggest that the 
Organization has a very high level of influence over LA 21 in Europe (where 
5,000 of the 6,400 LA 21 initiatives exist worldwide)3. The influence, both 
formal (through Aalborg) and informal (through its consulting) suggests that 
the idea of multi-stakeholder planning exercises where the three legs of the sus-
tainable development stool—economy, social equity and environment—could 
be agreed upon by many European cities, at least rhetorically, as both worthy 
goals and politically palatable. Moreover, the intention was to use the informa-
tion from these processes to develop policies that captured the community’s 
vision for itself. Finally, municipalities would develop policies to create norms 
in development that support these goals. 
Another critical area to examine is how LA 21 agendas are supported by 
the functions of the state. Despite calls for fundamental change, it is not sur-
prising that the adoption of LA 21 was not a total paradigm shift in Europe 
(or the US as described below). It emerged in the context of existing state 
functions and regulatory mechanisms. Typically, these occur along two axes, 
market oriented ‘regulation’ and state-based command and control. In Europe, 
state-based regulation remains a dominant force that influences development 
patterns and land use. This is to say that local authorities (and regional and 
national ones, too) have the capacity to clearly direct outcomes of urban devel-
opment through performance standards and other forms of command and 
control regulation. The Dutch, for example, set minimum density standards 
at 33 units per hectare in an effort to promote compact cities with smaller 
ecological footprints. According to Beatley (2000, p. 33) there is a sense in 
The Netherlands, as in other places like Germany and Denmark, that the rural 
fringe of cities is not transitional and up for grabs for development. Thus, 
market forces in these countries can be closely regulated so they more appro-
3. For example, ICLEI may have signed up thousands of communities to the sustainability 
cause and consulted with hundreds on their planning efforts. However, this level of process 
participation does not suggest whether these communities are actually more sustainable or 
whether their development practices has indeed changed.
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priately align with the dictates of the LA 21 process. Many local authorities in 
the US have moved away from these types of administrative functions towards 
what Harvey (1989) calls ‘entrepreneurial’ functions. In these cities command 
and control regulation, as well as other attendant ‘Fordist’ state functions, are 
viewed to hinder economic development because they create barriers for firms, 
businesses or developers seeking to locate within their borders. 
Another context where European approaches works to affect LA 21 changes 
is at the regional scale. In contrast to the US, regional governance in Europe 
remains powerful. More importantly, there is often coordination and patterns 
between local, regional and national authorities. In Switzerland, municipalities 
must prepare their local plans in accordance with Canton-level ‘Guiding Plans’. 
The Sustainable Development Framework for the Southeast of England, which 
is entitled ‘A Better Quality of Life for the Southeast’, was development by 
the Regional Assembly in 2001 and has been undergoing development and 
implementation by the South East England Economic Development Authority 
(SEEDA) since (Taking Stock, 2001). Despite appealing to the language of 
market liberalization, ‘the project sets out to help monitor policy decisions 
and actions to improve quality of life… and propose objectives, indicators 
and targets which all contain the themes of sustainable development’ (Taking 
Stock, 2001, p. 11). Here, regional agencies have a broader vision and regula-
tory function to implement their vision. In contrast, as discussed below, US 
regional organizations are typically voluntary, non-state mandated or have no 
authority to implement their own recommendations. 
The key point here is not to place European approaches to sustainable 
development on a pedestal. Indeed, the politics of sustainable development 
in the UK and Europe are as pernicious there as anywhere (Gibbs, 2002). 
The point is to draw out some important contrasts in the European (and UK) 
and US approaches to sustainable development. As stated at the outset, the 
commitment to LA 21, a broad base of regulatory functions (e.g., command 
and control regulation), coordination between regions and localities not only 
distinguishes difference, but provides an explanation for why LA 21 did not 
gain popularity and why smart growth has. The paper now examines the USA’s 
engagement with the question of sustainable development and dovetail this 
discussion into the advent of smart growth. 
A View from the USA
The US is home to 22 of the some 6000 LA 21 initiatives worldwide (ICLEI, 
2002) (See Table 2). These cities are spread throughout the country, with the 
largest cluster (N=13) occurring on the West Coast, some 5.7 million people 
of a total of 249 million. A few cities were caught in the momentum of LA 
21 in the early 1990s, small ‘left-leaning’ cities like Santa Monica, California, 
Santa Cruz, California and Olympia, Washington. Other cities had differ-
ent motivations. In his analysis of these 22 cities Lake (2000) suggests there 
are three key motivations behind LA 21 intiatives in America: 1) liveabilty/
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quality of life, 2) engaging private development to cushion negative spillover 
effects of development, and 3) the local state as an initiator of institutional 
change (Lake, 2000: pp. 86-87). Of these 22 initiatives only a single city, 
Burlington, Vermont, reported that the motivation for adopting LA 21 was to 
pursue a ‘multifaceted’ form of sustainable development (Lake, 2000). Other 
cities adopted the LA 21 approach in an effort to address tensions of rapid 
population growth (e.g., Olympia, Washington and Portland, Oregon), while 
still others sought to ignite stagnate economies (e.g., Boston, Massachusetts, 
Chattanooga, Tennessee). Still others focused their concerns on environmental 
quality and liveability (e.g., Berkeley and Santa Monica, California). 
No matter what the motivation was for adopting a LA 21 approach in the 
1990s, there is one common feature to the vast majority of these initiatives; 
they did not gain traction in the public sphere or in the formal political chan-
nels of the appropriate local authority department. Indeed, there are some 
exceptions. Some cities like Portland, Oregon, Santa Monica, California and 
Seattle, Washington have made strides to promote local and regional sustain-
able development. The City of Santa Monica, California, is a leader among 
US cities striving for environmental sustainability and its initiative is unique 
in that it is contained within the City Administration (Brugmann, 1997). The 
City’s sustainable development plan, which focused on resource conservation, 
transportation, pollution prevention and public health protection, and com-
munity and economic development, was adopted by the City Council and has 
been a guiding policy document since (Portney, 2003). Sustainable Seattle, 
a non-profit entity that initiated that City’s LA 21 efforts, held charrettes in 
which nearly 13,000 people in total participated. Despite the reported suc-
cesses of these outliers LA 21 has failed to generate a broad level of support. 
Regardless of a few successes, the failure of LA 21 as a policy approach in the 
Figure 2. Local Agenda 21 in the US. Source: LAKE (2000).
Smart Growth and Its Discontents Doc. Anàl. Geogr. 2010, vol. 56/3 417
US is undeniable. Beyond city and regional governments around the US, 
ICLEI’s main US office itself renamed its LA 21-oriented activities several 
years ago to “Communities 21” (Quaid, 2003). Even with the name change, 
the Communities 21 process remains largely non-existent among policy mak-
ers. As one ICLEI staffer pointed out, “much of the effort is on the Cities for 
Climate Change Campaign, it has more traction with funders and the grass 
roots” (ICLEI 2006). 
Since the mid to late 1990s other US cities and regions have pursued sus-
tainable development agendas in various forms. Portney (2003) identified 24 
cities that he states are ‘taking sustainability seriously’, albeit to varying degrees. 
Berke and Manta-Conroy (2000) in their study of what difference a sustain-
able plan makes in actual sustainable development policies sampled 30 US 
cities for their study. With Agyeman, I’ve identified 49 cities with sustainable 
development initiatives and plans. There is some duplication amongst these 
data and about 30 cities have sustainable development plans beyond those 
who began LA 21 processes. So what do ‘sustainable development’ policies in 
a US city look like? 
Like the European cities and regions, US districts use ‘off the shelf policy’ 
mechanisms to promote sustainable development. Typically their focus is on 
brownfield redevelopment, cluster zoning (density zoning), zoning to deline-
ate environmentally sensitive areas (such as ground water overlay districts), 
comprehensive plans that include environmental issues and solid waste recy-
cling (see Portney, 2003). Some offer alternative energy programs and a few 
have bike paths. These themes certainly resonate with some of the European 
practices, especially those around creating compact cities. Not surprisingly, 
however, the sustainable development non-LA 21 initiatives take on a different 
form than their European counterparts. The US-based initiatives are informed 
by a different process and context for coordination and a different ensemble 
of state norms. It is here, through a brief exploration of these key differences, 
we can start to see the logic underneath the contours of sustainable develop-
ment in the US. 
Outside of the initial 22 cities mentioned above the process of LA 21 never 
gained traction in the US. Indeed, planning requires participation, and this has 
become the norm in the US (Kelley and Becker, 2000). Yet, the LA 21 process 
requires not only an effective process for participation, but integration between 
participation and the sustainability inventory and the visioning. This assumes 
(see Milestone 3 above) that new policies would be developed or old ones 
enhanced to account for the new scope that emerged from the public visioning 
sessions. While a number of cities have sustainability indicator projects, few 
are actually integrated into an action plan (Portney, 2003). Still fewer have 
comprehensive land use plans that cover the three dimensions of sustainabil-
ity (Warner, 2002). Moreover, when one examines the types of policies that 
are in place to support sustainable development we see the ‘economic’ nature 
of their intent. For most cities, brownfields are about returning swaths of 
former industrial lands to the tax roles, cluster zoning is about maximizing land 
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values, and eco-village, eco-industrial parks and green building standards 
remain largely absent from the inventory of policies in these cities (see also 
Gibbs et al., 2005). Sustainable development may be more of a convenient 
after thought than a driving force, as the LA 21 process directs. But the local 
and regional commitment to the three domains of sustainable development 
could be called into question on either side of the pond. The real distinction 
between the US and Europe’s LA 21 is in their different appeals to policy 
directives.
The policy approaches for promoting sustainable development also tell 
another story. In particular, the state’s role in delivering sustainable develop-
ment. Zoning, brownfield redevelopment, environmental overlays, and so 
forth are typically incentive driven rather than standard imposing. According 
the American land use scholar Babcock (1964) the purpose of zoning is to 
first, preserve the single family home, and second to maximize property values 
without causing a corresponding decrease in the value of other property. The 
notion of wealth maximization is critical here. It exemplifies an institutional-
ized set of values dating back to Westward expansion 150 years ago, that land 
be developed for its highest use. So while cluster zoning may have the added 
benefit of preserving green space, the motivation behind it has its origins in 
economics. As Ratcliff (1961, p. 328), an acclaimed American real estate law 
professor once remarked, ‘In the perfect market, natural zoning would result’. 
The point of zoning is to work out those market imperfections (e.g., nuisances, 
most appropriate land use) because the market is the institution that is ulti-
mately capable of imposing social value on land, rather than the state. Hence, 
state imposed standards, such as those described in Denmark, run counter to 
the ideology of the market (and zoning as a policy mechanism) and thus may 
not be acceptable to many municipalities in the United States. The dominant 
regulatory mechanisms for land use in the US, then, are those that are market 
based or those embedded in market values. Even proponents of the compact 
cities, new urbanism and smart growth are pro-market. As one prominent new 
urbanist suggested, “If they want to live in sprawl, that’s fine. We just don’t 
want it subsidized” (Norquist, cited in Flint, 2006). 
The American variant of sustainable development, should it actually exist, 
is distinct from its European counterparts. As we shall see below, Americans 
seem to be interested in various aspects of sustainable development, but as 
it relates to quality of life, sense of place and the ‘triple-win’, but not LA 21 
and regulatory overhaul (i.e., bringing back command and control). There 
too remains a fundamental belief in the market and the freedom it alleges to 
bring. This is where smart growth comes in. It can handle these American 
sensibilities. 
Smart Growth: An American Variant of Sustainable Development?
The previous section the paper suggested that the US and Europe have 
approached sustainable development in different ways. The paper now turns 
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to an examination of the smart growth phenomenon in America to further 
flesh out these differences. What are the key policy mechanisms of smart 
growth? How do they differ from LA 21? Moreover, do smart growth’s policy 
goals represent a move toward more local and regional sustainable develop-
ment patterns? To examine the first two questions the paper examines smart 
growth’s origins in Maryland and popularity around the US. It also examines 
it in terms of the three themes introduced above. In an effort to examine the 
third question the paper presents a case study from Massachusetts. 
What is smart growth?
According to the US Environmental Protection Agency (2006), ‘[S]mart 
growth is development that serves the economy, the community and the envi-
ronment’. For Anderson (1998, 4), ‘Smart growth recognizes the connections 
between development and quality of life. It leverages new growth to improve 
the community… It also preserves open space and many other environmental 
amenities.’ To accomplish these tripartite goals smart growth policies tend 
to promote development that has the following characteristics: high-density 
development around public transport nodes, development that occurs in older 
suburbs and inner cities and mixed land uses (retail, commercial and residen-
tial). Other motivations for smart growth are related to the fiscal crisis of the 
local state, such as the cost of new infrastructure provision and maintenance 
not traditionally borne by developers (e.g., schools, sewerage and roads). Still 
others seek to impose state and regional vision into the local planning process 
(this was a key aspect of the Maryland approach and, for different reasons the 
Massachusetts smart growth approach). 
Though this type of land development only adopted the moniker ‘smart 
growth’ a dozen or so years ago, the ideas behind ‘smart growth’ have a longer 
history. After the US federal government abdicated any substantial role in 
land use planning in the early 1970s some states embarked on their own 
planning reforms (Wheeler, 2004). Often referred to as the ‘quiet revolu-
tion’ states such as Hawaii, Vermont and Massachusetts (to name three), 
imposed specific growth controls on local development out of concern for 
protected areas. These changes were prompted by affordable housing issues 
(Massachusetts), loss of farmland (Vermont) and ecologically sensitive areas 
(Hawaii) and modeled after the command and control model being institu-
tionalized for environmental policy at the national scale (DeGrove, 1984). 
Some states, like Florida and Vermont, required local plans to coordinate with 
regional and state planning goals and regional approval for large development 
permits. In the 1980s ‘growth control’ gave way to ‘growth management’ in 
a second wave of planning reform. Under these Reagan-era growth manage-
ment regimes, command and control style regulation was supplanted by more 
rigorous cost-benefit analysis. Adequate Public Facilities Ordinances (APFOs) 
a new regulatory mechanism, for example, shifted the focus from explicitly 
stated environmental priorities and required local planning boards to con-
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sider whether the pace of local development outpaced the ability of the local 
authority (based on planned capital expenditures) to provide adequate public 
infrastructure (e.g., roads, sewerage, schools). If the authority could not keep 
up, then a development could not move forward unless the developer was will-
ing to fund the improvements (Knapp and Nelson 1992). Smart growth, the 
third wave of planning reform in the US, devolved the ‘growth management’ 
paradigm further by abandoning the use of regulations for securing environ-
mental benefits or affordable housing to the use of incentives through ‘Priority 
Funding Areas’. Maryland Governor Parris Glendening was the progenitor of 
this movement and his state’s policy is often referred to as the paradigmatic 
smart growth example.
Until 1997, Maryland’s planning policy looked much like the growth 
management policies mentioned above. The ‘Economic Growth, Resource 
Protection and Planning Act of 1992’ represents the second generation of 
planning reform discussed above. It required local comprehensive plans to be 
consistent with eight state visions of development. “The Growth Act identi-
fied four types of sensitive areas for special protection: streams and stream 
buffers, 100-year floodplains, habitats for endangered species and steep slopes. 
Nevertheless, it was left to local governments to draft plans and protect these 
and other sensitive areas’ (Freece, 2004; 1). In 1994, Parris Glendening was 
elected governor of Maryland, and by 1997 the state’s Smart Growth and 
Neighborhood Conservation Initiative passed the state legislature. “Glendening 
had become frustrated with the state’s inability to influence a county govern-
ment’s decision to build a huge new mini-city in an old-growth forest on the 
banks of the Potomac River. Furthermore, Glendening was bothered by the 
inability of the state to intervene in a quaint eastern shore town’s fight to stop 
the merchandizing giant, Wal-Mart, from killing the town’s downtown busi-
nesses’ (Freece, 2004; 2). 
The new Smart Growth Initiative had three interrelated goals: 1) to save 
the state’s most valuable natural resources, 2) to support existing communities 
and neighborhoods, and 3) save taxpayers millions in the unnecessary cost of 
building the infrastructure required to support sprawl4. The Smart Growth 
Initiative did this without proposing any new land use controls or management 
schemes. Indeed, the mechanism for promoting ‘smart growth’ was simple: the 
state would use its investment strategies as an incentive to direct local devel-
opment in ways that were consistent with the goals of the Act. According to 
Freece (2004) this approach was based on Glendening’s belief that state fund-
ing decisions could affect a developer’s bottom line and therefore affect their 
decisions on where to build. This goal was accomplished primarily through 
the Priority Funding Areas (PFA) provisions of the law. The PFA was explicit 
about its development goals; no project existing outside a PFA would be eligi-
ble for state funding. In the US, states allocate hundreds of millions of dollars 
4. Smart Growth and Neighborhood Revitalization Act, Maryland Laws 4335, Ch. 759 
(1997).
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per year to localities to support development projects. Under the 1997 law in 
Maryland state funds would no longer be made available to projects through 
the normal financial allocation approach, but would be required to be within 
a PFA. The idea, then, is that through financial incentives the state could redi-
rect regional development away from green belts, agricultural land and other 
environmentally sensitive areas (e.g., riparian zones) through these incentives. 
Thus the smart growth approach drew upon existing concerns (e.g., environ-
mental protection, affordable housing, etc) that had been codified through 
different policies in previous decades. However, rather than updating regula-
tions or outlining specific management strategies the approach went for the 
economic approach, to affect the developer’s bottom line business decision.
Other aspects of the Smart Growth Initiative drew upon existing policy ini-
tiatives to promote a more sustainable Maryland (though without the language 
of sustainable development). These included brownfield redevelopment and 
public transport programs. The brownfield provisions, for example, included 
clauses limiting a developer’s financial liability for contamination on former 
industrial sites if they created mixed-use developments on them. In addition, 
the state provided low interest loans for the actual clean up. Similarly, the ‘Live 
Near Your Work Program’ provides cash incentives for people interested in 
living inside designated development areas. 
Maryland was just the beginning for smart growth in the US. In contrast 
to LA 21, smart growth policies have proliferated in the US. In 2000, the 
American Planning Association reported that 533 state or local ballot initiatives 
focused on planning or smart growth issues (cited in Tregoning et al. 2002). In 
the subsequent election cycle voters in 24 states and nearly 200 communities 
approved 137 of 196 ballot measures raising $1.7 billion dollars for open space 
and parks. Similarly, the Pew Center for Civic Journalism released a poll in 
2000 that found people rank sprawl alongside crime as a top concern. Indeed, 
people’s awareness of the concept of smart growth is also increasing. In 1996 it 
was a theme in fewer than 100 stories in American newspapers. By 2001, that 
number leapt to over 4600 smart growth related stories.5 But there are other 
key differences between LA 21 and smart growth. 
Smart growth responds to perceived land use problems in Maryland (or 
California or Massachusetts or Minnesota). Perhaps Professor Ratcliff (men-
tioned above) would agree that smart growth might be the market fix that 
produces ‘natural’ zoning. And herein lies the fundamental difference between 
smart growth and LA 21: smart growth fundamentally relies on the market to 
drive decisions that might promote sustainable development. LA 21 in contrast 
relies on the democratic process to produce a set of goals that are then sup-
ported by the power of the state, regardless of market forces. Hence, in contrast 
5. Despite the amount of attention given to smart growth around the US, some commentators 
suggest it’s talked about more than acted upon (DOWNS, 2005). Others are concerned 
that because it is so popular it means anything to anyone (YE, et al., 2005). These same 
debates exist in Europe, too (GIBBS, 2002). 
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to LA 21, smart growth policies and directions do not emerge from multistake-
holder participation processes, but from consumer tastes, fiscal constraint and 
growth coalitions of environmental advocacy groups, developers, local eco-
nomic development authorities and affordable housing advocates. According 
to Ye et al (2005, 302), ‘It is increasingly obvious that different environmental 
organizations, government agencies, and interest groups define smart growth in 
their own ways to achieve their particular missions and goals’. Indeed, Freece 
(2004) notes that there was very limited public input in the Maryland Smart 
Growth Initiative. ‘The PFA Act failed to stipulate any process that local gov-
ernments are required to follow as they establish PFAs for their jurisdictions’ 
(Freece, 2004; 11). Smart growth is not grass roots driven, but a form of ‘rep-
resentative’ development where interest groups shape development policies and 
their implementation. Another difference between smart growth and LA 21 is 
motivation. LA 21 resulted from a practical interest to set the world’s localities 
on a more sustainable path. Smart growth, in contrast, was originally conceived 
as a policy measure to address a particular problem: suburban sprawl and the 
detritus that accompanies it (Downs, 2005). Sustainable development themes 
run through the sprawl problem: air pollution from auto centric communities, 
loss of open space and ecological services, affordable housing6. Ultimately, 
however, under the smart growth model it is the incentives that the states 
provides and subsequent market reactions that bring about more sustainable 
outcomes, not the collective deliberation of stakeholders. 
It would indeed appear that the time has come for smart growth in the 
US. But how does this new paradigm for land use regulation and sustainable 
development work on the ground? What are the regional tensions, which seem 
to be unresolved? The paper will now explore these issues through a case study 
from Worcester, Massachusetts. 
Case Study: Growing Smart in Massachusetts?
In America, faith in the market is a deeply imbedded social more. For some, 
the market is an institution capable of promoting rational, amoral choices 
beyond the power of a few. As a policy promoting sustainable development, 
smart growth seems to fit with this way of thinking. The case study pre-
sented below seeks to flesh out further the key processes, institutions and 
organizations taking responsibility for ‘delivering’ sustainable development. 
Clearly, this represents a single case study, and generalization —in the US or 
the European cases— is problematic. However, the cases do capture common 
differences in the US and Europe as evidenced by the broader secondary data 
reviewed above. This section briefly examines local and regional influences 
governing smart growth in Worcester, Massachusetts.
6. Affordable housing here does not imply social housing, but housing for key workers who 
are pushed out of the housing market by skyrocketing property values in certain regions of 
the country. 
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Worcester, Massachusetts, is an industrial revolution-era boomtown. 
From the 1830s to the 1950s the city acted as a piston of the region’s eco-
nomic growth engine. The original impetus for the region’s growth was the 
Blackstone Canal, which connected Worcester and the surrounding region 
to the Narragansett Bay in Rhode Island and the world of global trade. The 
canal was replaced by the railroad after 20 years, and Worcester’s economic 
reach extended across the country to California and around the world. In and 
around the canal industrial area, the city’s industries invented and fabricated 
barbed wire for America’s western expansion and provided uniforms for Union 
troops during the Civil War. Like many industrial regions in the Western 
world, economic restructuring wrought havoc on the economy of the city 
and region, beginning in earnest in the 1950s when the economic benefits of 
World War Two waned in the region. In 1950, the city’s population peaked 
at around 200,000. It was not until the 1990s that the city’s population began 
to rise; first attracting immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean, then 
knowledge workers from the Boston area in search of affordable housing. In 
2006, for example, Worcester continues to be a cheaper place to live with the 
cost of a home averaging $241,000, compared to Boston’s $468,000. 
Establishing Laissez-Faire Planning Norms in Worcester
In its own way, planning activities in Worcester exemplify laissez-faire norms. 
In particular, the planning function of the city has migrated from the planning 
department to the city’s economic development office, and to private interests 
in the community. For decades the planning department had been a fairly mar-
ginalized department within the City administrative structure. Throughout the 
1980s and 90s the Office of Planning and Community Development (OPCD) 
became less of a city-wide planning entity and focused more on neighbor-
hood development, especially for neighborhoods in transition. Which made 
sense because the funding the city received from the federal government came 
largely in the form of grants for communities in need. Increasingly, however, 
the way federal government grants began working meant that Community 
Development Corporations (CDCs), private non-profits, did most of the work 
on planning and neighborhood development while the city acted as a dissemi-
nator of funds to the half dozen CDCs. Eventually, OPCD personnel were 
absorbed by various city departments or moved to other positions outside the 
city administration (e.g., the economic development office, the Worcester 
Regional Development Authority). In 2003, remnants of the planning office 
were finally absorbed by the Office of Neighborhood Services, which then 
limited its focus to regulatory services, such as staffing the citizen-run planning 
board. When the city did engage in citywide planning or economic target zones 
in the downtown, as opposed to small-scale neighborhood planning, consult-
ants did most of the work on behalf of the economic development office. 
The city thus eliminated or outsourced most of its planning responsibilities. 
This made room for groups such as the Worcester Sustainable Development 
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Initiative and Common Pathways (a healthy communities initiative) to try 
and fill the void. It also made room for developers to have their way with the 
city’s impressive stock of industrial revolution era buildings and remaining 
developable open space.
At this same time this shift in the planning function took place, Worcester 
actively began to make itself more competitive regionally. The strategy here 
has been two-fold. First, the city has sought to attract business from the life 
sciences cluster, in Cambridge, Massachusetts and in the I-495 corridor, by 
leveraging local university resources and a local non-profit incubator the 
Massachusetts Biomedical Initiative. Second, following a study commissioned 
by the Office of Neighborhood Services that found Boston families are will-
ing to move out West, the Report notes the rapid expansion of towns in the 
Worcester region compared to the city’s own expansion, 15.9% and 4.9%, 
respectively. This data led the report’s author to conclude that Worcester’s 
housing stock does not provide enough higher end options for today’s knowl-
edge workers (RKG, 2002). The city’s elites thus sought to create Worcester’s 
21st century identity through doing something that its predecessors would 
not consider - looking East for opportunity. So, with much fanfare the city 
administration is working to establish Worcester as a bedroom community 
to Boston by providing more housing opportunities for knowledge workers 
priced out of the Boston market. The Canal District, discussed further below, 
the ‘CitySquare’ mixed-use development project, which will raise a derelict 
downtown mall constructed a generation ago, are evidence of this strategy. In 
addition, the City is forever trying to increase the convenience of the com-
muter rail service to Boston. Besides recreating the landscape of the central 
business district by way of the City Square Project, the growth coalition is 
repositioning the city’s large stock of industrial revolution-era buildings. These 
brownfields, some contaminated but many not, are the focus of many devel-
opment strategies. Concomitant with this shift in strategy has been a de facto 
shift in where the planning functions of city occur. They are now a primary 
function of the City’s increasingly professionalized economic development 
office, not the office of planning and regulatory affairs which has had its plan-
ning function interpreted more narrowly to regulate development, primarily 
housing, through the zoning ordinances.7 
7. Despite having its responsibilities narrowly defined by the city administration, the office 
of planning and regulatory affairs has been a progressive force in the city’s effort to make 
energy efficiency and renewables part of its new energy strategy. The department has worked 
closely with ICLEI and more cutting edge cities to revamp its zoning codes to allow for 
wind power. The planning office has also worked feverishly to preserve a key water resource 
by implementing for the first time a water protection overlay district. 
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Regional Competition, Not Cooperation
Despite the failure of city and regional groups to capitalize on the planning 
void during the late 1990s and at the turn of the century, groups with more 
focused interests did begin gaining traction. The efforts of one group, in par-
ticular, have captured the imagination of the city administration and many 
residents as well. Until recently, when the competitive city discourse was 
adopted by the new administration and council, the Blackstone Canal Task 
Force, a partnership of civic leaders, government officials, business leaders and 
developers and environmentalists, worked almost outside the city administra-
tion. Building off the idea that some second tier former industrial cities could 
capitalize on their historic pasts to promote investment opportunities (e.g., 
Chattanooga, Tennessee; Providence, Rhode Island; Manchester and Leeds, 
UK) the Task Force set as its goal to reposition the large stock of industrial 
revolution-era buildings in the Blackstone Canal area as a mixed use develop-
ment (i.e., housing/retail opportunity) in support of regional sustainable devel-
opment and competitiveness. Also contributing to the area’s renaissance is the 
group’s rhetorical deployment of a powerful discourse that fuses the competi-
tive city-regionalism and livability discourses. The ideas of these discourses are 
typified by Richard Florida’s work on the ‘Creative Class’. For him, successful 
cities are ones that can attract investment by first attracting a select group of 
young workers, the nucleus of which is employed in “science and engineer-
ing, architecture and design, education, arts, music, and entertainment, [and] 
whose economic function is to create new ideas, new technology and/or new 
creative content” (Florida, 2004, p.8). He argues that to be attractive to this 
group, cities must, among other things, offer a specific lifestyle. As such, the 
group has leveraged the historical legacy of the place, the old factories as loft 
style apartments and unique retail spaces. Several factors converged to make 
this possible. First, in the mid-1990s the city of Worcester was included in 
the Blackstone Valley National Historic Corridor. Designed to commemo-
rate the area’s contribution to the American industrial revolution and bring 
much needed economic investment for tourism to the area, the inclusion in 
the corridor provided an entry point for the coalition to leverage the historic 
value of the Blackstone Canal, the terminus for which lies under a swathe of 
Worcester’s existing street network. In Worcester, the redevelopment of the 
old Union Train station as a link to Boston and the addition of the City to 
the Blackstone National Historic Corridor (managed by the National Park 
Service) made it possible to reposition the area in four ways: 1) a focus on 
the rich historical significance and aesthetic that would appeal to knowledge 
worker, 2) its proximity to the regional rail service, 3) the creation of housing 
opportunities on previously developed spaces that might curtail Worcester’s 
sprawling development pattern, 4) helping to position Worcester as the com-
petitive housing and business choice for the expanding Boston region economy 
(cf. Krueger and Gibbs 2008). Indeed, for the Coalition, the purpose of the 
project is: 
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...to use the waterway as a catalyst for urban renaissance. It would give the 
area a thematic identity, making it distinctive and attractive both as a place of 
residence and a tourist destination, immediately adjacent to I-290. The conti-
nuing popularity of commuter rail, the successful tenanting of Union Station, 
the suitability of the existing close-grained building stock for both housing and 
commercial development, the completion of the Route 146 project into this 
sector of the city, and the immediate access to Route 290 at Kelley Square all 
position the area for economic take-off. Much of its building stock is already 
being renovated into loft apartments – a form of housing that was previously 
unknown in the city and which is attracting a new kind of urban resident. 
Existing deli owners, bar owners and restauranteurs along the canal route are 
all eager to take advantage of waterfront locations. (Blackstone Canal Task 
Force, 2006)
The Task Force and the growth coalition it represents have adopted 
the smart growth approach both in rhetoric and in process. The Free the 
Blackstone study states, for example: ‘It [the Canal Project] will also serve 
as the armature of a new type of smart-growth, transit-oriented urban com-
munity with an identity that reaches out to the surrounding neighborhoods, 
institutions and the region. Worcester’s Canal district can become the nation-
al model of a 21st century sustainable community’ (Free the Blackstone, 
2003, 2). In terms of policy it seeks direct state investment on the merits of 
the smart growth approach and it proposes incentives for private businesses 
and developers to make the most of the canal. As one Task Force Member 
proudly put it: ‘It will to be the Commonwealth’s first smart growth effort, 
even predating the Romney administration’ (Task Force a, 2004). At the 
outset it would seem the Blackstone Canal Project could bring the elusive 
triple-win goal to the area. Markets, however, are as fickle as the values of a 
growth coalition. 
While the Blackstone Task Force has worked largely outside the city’s 
administration, to their credit they have sought to engage the public in their 
vision for the project. However, the scope of negotiations has not been on 
a broader vision for the community that the canal would be part of, but of 
the particulars of the project going forward. As one canal task force member 
stated, ‘this project is about creating the kind of community I’d want to live 
in’ (Task Force b, 2003). The smart growth discourse provides both a con-
nection to the region as well as a policy approach for realizing the vision. It 
also provides political cover and allows for a broader group of proponents 
to join the coalition. For the state, and the region, it contributes housing 
options for the coveted knowledge worker. The project does have environ-
mental merits. The Canal District provides a mixed-use community, with 
residential and retail co-existing, and proximity to transit stations. It also 
uses existing infrastructure. As the Worcester region approaches build-out, 
under current zoning conditions at least, the use of developed space for 
housing and retail will take the strain off of environmentally threatened and 
significant areas. 
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Housing affordability is much more problematic. The Canal District com-
prises a former industrial district and a former dormitory neighborhood to the 
area’s factories - Green Island. While most of the former factories remain vacant 
some are being turned into loft-style housing. Some light industry remains in 
the area as well as commercial retail. The neighborhood situated to the South 
of the industrial area is residence to 7,500 people who rank among the low-
est income communities in the city (Krueger, 2007). The average per capita 
income in Worcester in 2004 was $36,000 (BEA, 2006). In 1999, the average 
income of Green Island residents, which are was the existing residential area 
of the Canal District, was $20,339 (Census, 2006). Not surprisingly, most 
people in these neighborhoods do not own their homes, some 65% of housing 
units occupied by renters. Because the market is determined by the needs of 
the knowledge worker, not the needs of the current low-income residents in 
the community, the future of the current residents is uncertain. As one con-
sultant on the project stated when asked what would happen to those residents 
currently living in the area he stated, ‘Infill development will take care of the 
affordable housing need. That will be worked out in the second phase of the 
project, when private investment really takes off’ (Task Force c, 2003). This 
statement reflects trust in the market to compensate the losers of gentrification 
during the current wave of development. However, lofts in the area are currently 
selling for $240,000 at the low end. Thus the people who need protection from 
the vagaries of the market are those who are left out of the process and remain 
outside the development vision embodied in this smart growth development. 
The ‘Process’ of Smart Growth
A key goal of the Worcester city administration, the key for local economic 
survival/regeneration, is to link to the broader regional economy, both in terms 
of housing and employment opportunities. In Worcester, much effort toward 
this end is focused on attracting knowledge workers (or the creative class) to 
town. For Florida (2002), the self anointed guru and spokesman for this elusive 
group, to attract or retain this emergent class, politicians and administrators 
must create multi-dimensional experiences, which include cafes, galleries and 
coffee shops, indigenous street culture, indeed they must create “real world 
experiences” (pg. 166). Viewing the process from another perspective, Peck 
(2005) states, the approach is framed “around interurban competition, gentri-
fication, middle-class consumption, and place marketing” (pg. 2). Or, as Smith 
(1996) so clearly states, it is the inner city, where working class neighborhoods 
and factories once flourished that provide these real world experiences. Hence, 
art galleries and chic coffee shops become the stalwarts of neighborhood urban 
regeneration in America. And here is where a contradiction between the goals 
and mechanisms of the smart growth paradigm lies. Couched in the American 
dream of upward class mobility and freedom of choice in the market place, 
smart growth’s market mechanisms leaves the stability and well-being of those 
affected by development to the vagaries of the market. Moreover, just because 
428 Doc. Anàl. Geogr. 2010, vol. 56/3 Rob Krueger
environmental protection reflects a ‘taste’ of the current urban ‘pioneer’ does 
not mean it is protected in perpetuity. And, as was raised above, if the market 
supports sprawl, for progenitors of these policies, so be it. In Massachusetts, 
smart growth is about creating housing alternatives that meet consumer needs 
in a way that might alleviate the fiscal responsibility of local authorities. 
Finally, a core area of sustainable development is consumption. Smart growth 
does nothing to address it. In fact, one could argue that it creates venues for 
more efficient consumption. Indeed, it would be against the conventions of 
the market paradigm to require fair trade coffee to be sold in coffee shops or 
sweatshop free goods and the trendy local piece goods shop. This is not to say 
that LA 21 approaches require more, but they do create a venue, through the 
community visioning process, to vet these issues. 
Discussion
The Worcester case illustrates the differences between American Smart Growth 
approaches and governance to the LA 21 as described in Europe. Let me revisit 
the three themes I raised earlier in the paper: process, local and regional inte-
gration, and the role of the state. In this discussion section I will flesh out each 
of these themes in the Worcester context. 
The process of smart growth is very different from that of LA 21. Where the 
LA 21 process, in theory at least, is a bottom-up, community driven, consen-
sus-based approach, smart growth approaches in the US exist in the context of 
local governments in a state of demise, generally speaking. Housing and eco-
nomic development in the US are competitive in nature because they respond 
to the demands of the market’s “hidden hand,” federal government block 
grants to cities, where funds “passed through” to Community Development 
Corporations for construction and neighborhood revitalization. This privati-
zation of local state functions, which is arguably for the better in some cases, 
renders the local government in Worcester as one actor among many in the city 
governance. Moreover, because cities are in competition with one another for 
scarce public and private development resources those projects that promise the 
greatest benefits in terms of property taxes and other forms of local stimulus, 
are promoted by political boosters. In the case of Worcester, the Blackstone 
Canal Project proponents have garnered both resources and political capital to 
envisage their redevelopment goals for that neighborhood. But what of their 
process? The vision did not come from the community. The idea of “daylight-
ing” the canal has been around for30 years in the circles of Worcester elites. 
Indeed, much of the “process” in the Canal District has been getting buy-in 
from the current residents and businesses. While this has gone on for the past 
few years the transformation has already begun in earnest. The neighborhood 
has become a magnate for trendy restaurants and drinking establishments. 
Before the recent credit crunch it was also the location of loft development in 
the area’s disused factory buildings. So much for the development of a collec-
tive vision from the bottom up.
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This leads to the second theme: local/regional integration. In Massachusetts, 
there are no regional entities with formal political power. There are regional 
planning agencies, but these are weak and primarily serve the planning needs 
of communities through state contracts. Local and regional integration in 
Worcester is thus a willy-nilly process that is driven by the machinations of 
economic opportunity. The emergence of the Canal District exemplifies this. 
As stated previously, the “vision” for a raised canal has been around the since 
the 1970s. However, the ability to deliver on this vision only recently emerged 
during the second Massachusetts Miracle economic boom, which occurred in 
the late-1990s and lasted nearly a decade. During this time, housing prices 
soared east of Worcester, thus making Worcester a desirable location for those 
looking for a house at a reasonable price. Thus, Worcester’s planning emerged 
out of economic opportunism, not integrated local and regional strategic plan-
ning. 
Finally, how do the LA 21 norms and those of Smart Growth differ? The 
Smart Growth approach eschews direct government involvement in planning 
and development decisions. It seeks, as in the Maryland case, to direct what 
it considers good decisions through incentives. Yet, the market is often fickle. 
And, when dealing with the triple bottom line of sustainable development, it 
can be extremely fickle. “Rising tides raise all ships,” is an (in)famous quote 
attributed to the father of capitalism, Adam Smith. This notion has become 
naturalized in American approaches to economic development. It is natural-
ized, but not codified, however. The idea that winners should compensate 
losers has died an anonymous death in recent decades as wealth production has 
achieved pinnacle status among firms and governments. More troubling, how-
ever, is that it is naturalized in people too. Questions of redistribution or who 
is watching out for those who will be affected by negative externalities are rarely 
asked in the public discourse around economic development. Gentrification is a 
good thing? As a result (or maybe a result of) a rolled back state in the US, these 
questions are often overlooked. The state, in terms of local economic develop, 
or sustainable development, has been reduced to a coordinating function for 
developers, not a regulatory or monitoring agent. Thus the battle over state-
market relations has clearly gone to the market in this case.
The Worcester case illustrates the failure of smart growth as an approach 
for achieving local sustainable development. The case raises serious questions 
about the ability of smart growth to achieve the triple bottom line so sacred 
to sustainable development. Moreover, it suggested ‘market’ values are deter-
mined by coalitions of actors, perceptions of policy makers and a sometimes 
blind faith people have in the notion that rising tides raise all ships. Thus the 
market mechanisms of smart growth may simply provide a rhetorical cover 
that allows the sometimes competing domains of community stability, envi-
ronmental protection and economic performance to be reconciled. In this case 
this is manifested through the provision of affordable housing, but captured 
not through direct intervention but through providing the right incentives. 
It was also revealed that smart growth does nothing to address consumption. 
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It thus remains to be seen, even doubtful, whether smart growth, on its own, 
can produce sustainable outcomes or even balance the tripartite concerns of 
sustainable development.
Conclusion
The sustainable development discourse has a global reach, indeed. But the 
practice of rolling out sustainable development is not a straight-forward and 
unproblematic process. How sustainable development is “rolled out” is closely 
linked to how to ideas about the appropriateness of state intervention in the 
‘free market’ and specific regional issues related to economic development. 
The efforts of local authorities in Europe to implement LA 21 and those in 
the US interested in smart growth exemplify these tensions. This paper has 
sought frame regional sustainable development through these very different 
policy approaches to highlight the problematic nature of delivering sustainable 
development and the unintended consequences of these policies. 
As commentators have noted for some time, sustainable development has 
often focused on the environment while ignoring broader issues of social equity 
(Krueger and Savage 2007; Agyeman et al., (2003); Haughton and Hunter 
(1994). This notion becomes even more challenging when politics, power 
and market forces are brought into the analytical equation. For example, it 
would appear that smart growth in Worcester is about increasing the quality 
of life for key workers in the region’s most competitive sectors. Certain living 
environments, that happen to overlap with the goals of sustainable develop-
ment, are being recognized in the market. In terms of the environment this 
may be a watershed moment: for decades social scientists of various stripes 
have sought to generate ideas that might bring environmental protection 
(broadly conceived: ecological services as well as amenities) in line with free 
market economics. This seems to be happening, albeit somewhat obliquely, 
in Massachusetts. Yet, though we begin to approximate—that is we are now 
able, though with trepidation, to speak about how the economy and the envi-
ronment are more closely aligned—our policies that support this seem to be 
compromising social equity in the process. Thus, if we take Ratcliff’s perspec-
tive, the market has responded, with mild state interventions, to create a zoning 
policy that optimizes the tastes of the market. This raises questions about the 
notion market based, or third wave, sustainable development. 
Earlier in the paper a distinction is made between the LA 21 approach 
and the smart growth approach to local and regional sustainable develop-
ment. Despite their popularity in rhetorical terms, both approaches have yet 
to produce sustainable impacts beyond a very select group of places (Beatley 
2000; Downs 2005). The reasons for this could fill volumes. However, what 
it could suggest, in the US especially, is that the market does react to certain 
elements of sustainable development. The market is necessarily fickle, and this 
virtuous cycle of development ‘lite’ (such as it is) will not last. This implies 
two things: there remains a strong role for the state to mitigate the social costs 
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of development even when two-thirds of the sustainable development trium-
virate are represented in the market, and 2) the dichotomy state intervention 
or the free market is a sterile belief. The Massachusetts and Maryland cases 
show that state intervention can promote the progressive power in the market 
when the political will is there. The problem is that the market does not seem 
to internalize all of the externalities, which in this case is the social equity 
piece. Moreover, the market is selective about which environmental aspects it 
chooses to respond to. For Europe (and America too), an important consider-
ation emerging from this discussion is the changing market and the dynamics 
of state-market relations. Is there a post-Keynesian alternative to the reign of 
free market ideology (c.f. Hudson, 2003)? The Maryland and Massachusetts 
cases how states can intervene, without setting performance standards and 
targets, those things that in the free market rhetoric stifle the market’s power. 
The paper does not suggest European state’s relinquish power—indeed the 
US needs to wield more benevolent power over the market. Perhaps a closer 
examination of how a strong state could harness market forces where appro-
priate would be in order. The process of rolling-out sustainable development 
is a necessarily complex one. The tensions represented by LA 21 and smart 
growth in the US illustrate the limitations of both approaches in these times. 
The challenge is to establish policies that are politically nimble and uncom-
promisingly equitable. 
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